πͺ Windows Identity Infrastructure, Authentication Subsystems & Domain Dominance
Across enterprise corporate networks, over 90% of Fortune 500 organizations rely on Microsoft Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS) as their primary identity and access governance backbone. Understanding Windows security requires analyzing both local host internals and distributed enterprise domain architectures. At the standalone machine level, Windows isolates credentials within the Security Account Manager (SAM) registry hive and caches active logon sessions in the address space of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). When joined to a domain, identity verification shifts to Kerberos v5, a ticket-granting cryptographic protocol centered on the Domain Controller's Key Distribution Center (KDC). Because adversaries frequently target these mechanisms via credential dumping, NTLM Relay, Kerberoasting, and forged Golden Tickets, security engineers must dissect Windows authentication handshakes, enforce Credential Guard, and deploy rigorous security event auditing.
WINDOWS SECURITY SUBSYSTEM INTERACTION TOPOGRAPHY:
[USER INTERFACE & LOGON BROKERS]
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
β LogonUI.exe / Winlogon.exe (Secure Attention Sequence: SAS) β
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
β
βΌ (Credentials / Smart Card PIN)
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
β USER MODE: LOCAL SECURITY AUTHORITY SUB-SYSTEM SERVICE (lsass.exe) β
β β
β ββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ ββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ β
β β LSA Server (lsasrv.dll) βββββββββββββββΊβ Security Support Providers β β
β β Security policy enforcement, β β (SSPs): msv1_0.dll (NTLM), β β
β β audits, token generation β β kerberos.dll, cloudap.dll β β
β ββββββββββββββββ¬ββββββββββββββββ ββββββββββββββββ¬ββββββββββββββββ β
β β β β
β βΌ βΌ β
β βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ β
β β SAM / Local Store β β Active Directory (Domain) β β
β β Local accounts (C:\Windows\ β β Kerberos KDC Ticket Queries β β
β β System32\config\SAM) β β via LDAP / RPC (ntds.dit) β β
β βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ β
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ¬ββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
β
βΌ (Generates Windows Access Token: SIDs, Privileges)
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββͺβββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
KERNEL MODE: NTOSKRNL.EXE β
βΌ
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
β SECURITY REFERENCE MONITOR - SRM (ntoskrnl.exe) β
β β’ Enforces authorization decisions on EVERY handle creation and system call invocation. β
β β’ Compares Subject's Access Token (User SID, Group SIDs, Privileges) against the target β
β Object's Security Descriptor (Owner SID, Discretionary ACL - DACL, System ACL - SACL). β
β β’ Grants or denies ACCESS_MASK (FILE_READ_DATA, GENERIC_ALL); writes Security Event Logs. β
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
MD4(UTF-16LE(password))), protected at rest via the SYSKEY encryption key in the SAM registry hive, and cached in cleartext or hashed formats inside active lsass.exe process memory.
import hashlib
class WindowsCredentialEngine:
"""
Simulates the cryptographic algorithm used by Windows for NTLM hashing:
NTLM Hash = MD4( UTF-16LE( Plaintext_Password ) )
Notice: No salt is added! Identical passwords produce IDENTICAL hashes globally.
"""
@staticmethod
def compute_ntlm_hash(password: str) -> str:
# Encode string to little-endian UTF-16 bytes
utf16_bytes = password.encode('utf-16le')
# Compute legacy MD4 digest
md4_engine = hashlib.new('md4')
md4_engine.update(utf16_bytes)
return md4_engine.hexdigest().upper()
if __name__ == "__main__":
pwd = "EnterprisePassword#2026"
ntlm_hash = WindowsCredentialEngine.compute_ntlm_hash(pwd)
print("==========================================================================")
print(" WINDOWS LOCAL CREDENTIAL STORE ARCHITECTURE & HASH DERIVATION")
print("==========================================================================")
print(f"[*] Password Input : {pwd}")
print(f"[*] UTF-16LE Byte Stream : {pwd.encode('utf-16le').hex()[:32]}...")
print(f"[+] Derived NTLM Hash : {ntlm_hash}")
print("\n--- CREDENTIAL STORAGE SUBSYSTEM COMPARISON ---")
print("1. SAM REGISTRY HIVE (C:\\Windows\\System32\\config\\SAM):")
print(" β’ Stores local user accounts and NTLM hashes at rest.")
print(" β’ Encrypted on disk using RC4/AES with the master SYSKEY (stored in SYSTEM hive).")
print(" β’ Locked by the kernel exclusively while Windows is running.")
print("\n2. LSASS PROCESS MEMORY (lsass.exe):")
print(" β’ Holds active decrypted Kerberos session keys, NTLM hashes, and Plaintext WDigest tokens.")
print(" β’ Adversary target: Tools like Mimikatz inject into lsass.exe memory using")
print(" OpenProcess(PROCESS_VM_READ) to extract credentials directly from RAM.")
THE 6-STEP ACTIVE DIRECTORY KERBEROS v5 AUTHENTICATION LIFECYCLE:
[CLIENT WORKSTATION] [DOMAIN CONTROLLER (KDC)] [TARGET SERVICE: e.g., MSSQL]
β β β
ββ 1. AS-REQ (Authentication Request)βΊβ β
β Client requests TGT. Encrypts β β
β timestamp with User's Hash. β β
β β β
βββ 2. AS-REP (Authentication Reply)βββ€ β
β KDC validates timestamp. Returnsβ β
β TGT (Encrypted with krbtgt key) β β
β + Ephemeral TGT Session Key. β β
β β β
ββ 3. TGS-REQ (Ticket-Granting Req)βββΊβ β
β Client sends TGT + requested β β
β Service Principal Name (SPN). β β
β β β
βββ 4. TGS-REP (Ticket-Granting Reply)β€ β
β KDC verifies TGT. Returns β β
β Service Ticket (TGS) encrypted β β
β with the Target Service's Hash. β β
β β β
ββ 5. AP-REQ (Application Request)βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββΊβ
β Client presents TGS + Authenticator. β
β Target decrypts TGS using its own service password hash. β
β β
βββ 6. AP-REP (Mutual Auth Reply - Optional)ββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ€
β Service proves identity back to client. Session established! β
βΌ βΌ
CRYPTOGRAPHIC COMPONENTS OF A KERBEROS TICKET:
β’ TGT (Ticket Granting Ticket): Contains Client SID, Domain SIDs, Privileges (PAC), and Session Key.
Encrypted exclusively with the Domain Controller's Master 'krbtgt' account password hash!
β’ PAC (Privilege Attribute Certificate): Embedded Windows authorization data listing all group
memberships (Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins). Signed by KDC to prevent privilege escalation.
KERBEROS ATTACK VECTORS & ARCHITECTURAL IMPACT:
1. KERBEROASTING (MITRE ATT&CK T1558.003):
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
β β’ Mechanism: ANY valid domain user (even low-privilege guest) can request a TGS service β
β ticket for ANY registered Service Principal Name (SPN) across the domain (e.g. MSSQLSvc). β
β β’ Flaw: The returned TGS ticket is encrypted with the service account's NTLM password hash. β
β β’ Exploit: Attacker extracts ticket from memory and cracks it offline using Hashcat/John: β
β hashcat -m 13100 kerberoast_hashes.txt wordlist.txt -r rules/rockyou-30000.rule β
β β’ Impact: If the service account uses a weak password, attacker gains full service account β
β credentials without sending a single suspicious packet to the target database server! β
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
2. AS-REP ROASTING (MITRE ATT&CK T1558.004):
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
β β’ Mechanism: Accounts configured with "Do not require Kerberos preauthentication" β
β (DONT_REQ_PREAUTH) do not need to encrypt timestamps to request an AS-REP. β
β β’ Exploit: Attacker sends an unauthenticated AS-REQ for that username. The DC replies with β
β an AS-REP containing encrypted session material using the user's password hash! β
β β’ Impact: Allows offline password cracking without needing an initial compromised domain user.β
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
3. GOLDEN TICKET FORGERY (COMPLETE DOMAIN COMPROMISE - T1558.001):
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
β β’ Prerequisite: Attacker extracts the password hash of the domain's 'krbtgt' account (e.g. viaβ
β DCSync attack against Active Directory database ntds.dit). β
β β’ Execution: With the krbtgt hash, the attacker crafts a completely forged, valid TGT ticket! β
β β’ Forgery Attributes: β
β βββ Target Username : Administrator (or any arbitrary username) β
β βββ User RID : 500 (Built-in Administrator) β
β βββ Group Membership: RID 512 (Domain Admins), 519 (Enterprise Admins) β
β βββ Lifetime : 10 Years (Default is 10 hours) β
β β’ Result: Attacker maintains persistence. The DC trusts the forged ticket implicitly because β
β it validates mathematically against the valid krbtgt hash! Changing the admin password does β
β NOT invalidate the Golden Ticket; the krbtgt password must be reset TWICE to remediate! β
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
THE LLMNR POISONING & NTLM RELAY EXPLOITATION PIPELINE:
[VICTIM USER ON WORKSTATION]
β
ββ 1. User mistypes share path in File Explorer: "\\acounting-files\share"
β
ββ 2. DNS query fails (Name does not exist in DNS).
β
ββ 3. Windows falls back to broadcast name resolution:
β Broadcasts LLMNR (UDP 5355) / NBT-NS (UDP 137) to entire local subnet:
β "Who has name: acounting-files? Tell 192.168.1.50"
β
βΌ
[ATTACKER RUNNING RESPONDER ON SAME SUBNET (192.168.1.100)]
β
ββ 4. Attacker immediately sends spoofed LLMNR response:
β "I am acounting-files! Connect to 192.168.1.100"
β
βΌ
[VICTIM WORKSTATION ESTABLISHES SMB SESSION TO ATTACKER]
β
ββ 5. Attacker presents NTLMSSP Challenge (Random 8-byte server nonce).
β
ββ 6. Victim responds with NetNTLMv2 Hash:
β HMAC-MD5( NTLM_Hash, Username || Domain || ServerChallenge || ClientNonce )
β
βΌ
[ATTACKER EXECUTES NTLM RELAY INSTEAD OF CRACKING]
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
β NTLM RELAY ATTACK (ntlmrelayx): β
β Rather than cracking the NetNTLMv2 hash offline, the attacker RELAYS the authentication β
β packets in real-time to a third server where SMB Signing is disabled (e.g. 192.168.1.200)! β
β 1. Attacker connects to Server B βββΊ Requests challenge. β
β 2. Attacker forwards Server B challenge to Victim. β
β 3. Victim solves challenge βββΊ Attacker forwards response back to Server B! β
β 4. Server B validates authentication! Attacker executes code as the Victim user on Server B! β
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
ntds.dit.
ACTIVE DIRECTORY ENTERPRISE LOGICAL & PHYSICAL STRUCTURE:
1. THE FOREST HIERARCHY (THE ULTIMATE SECURITY BOUNDARY):
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
β ACTIVE DIRECTORY FOREST (nikita-infotech.com) β
β β’ Shares a single common Schema (Class and Attribute definitions). β
β β’ Shares a single Global Catalog (GC - Port 3268) indexing all objects across all trees. β
β β’ Security Invariant: The Domain is an administrative boundary; the FOREST is the ultimate β
β security boundary! Compromising one domain in a forest can compromise the entire forest! β
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
β
ββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ΄βββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
βΌ βΌ
ββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ ββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
β PARENT DOMAIN: nikita-infotech.com βββββββββΊβ CHILD DOMAIN: dev.nikita-infotech.com β
β Domain Controller: DC01 (FSMO Master) β Two-Wayβ Domain Controller: DC02 β
β Hosts ntds.dit Active Directory Database β Trust β Hosts dev OU, groups, and workstations β
ββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ ββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
2. THE FIVE FSMO (FLEXIBLE SINGLE MASTER OPERATION) ROLES:
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββ¬βββββββββββββββββββ¬βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
β FSMO ROLE NAME β SCOPE β OPERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY β
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββΌβββββββββββββββββββΌβββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ€
β Schema Master β Forest-Wide (1) β Controls modifications to AD schema definitions. β
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββΌβββββββββββββββββββΌβββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ€
β Domain Naming Master β Forest-Wide (1) β Authorizes adding or removing domains in forest. β
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββΌβββββββββββββββββββΌβββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ€
β PDC Emulator β Domain-Wide (1) β Authoritative time server (NTP), password changesβ
β β β immediate sync, account lockouts, GPO management.β
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββΌβββββββββββββββββββΌβββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ€
β RID Master β Domain-Wide (1) β Allocates blocks of Relative IDs (RIDs) to DCs. β
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββΌβββββββββββββββββββΌβββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ€
β Infrastructure Master β Domain-Wide (1) β Handles cross-domain object reference updates. β
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββ΄βββββββββββββββββββ΄βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
3. THE CORE DATABASE: C:\Windows\NTDS\ntds.dit
β’ An Extensible Storage Engine (ESE / JET Blue) database containing every user account,
group membership, computer object, and cryptographic hash in the entire domain.
β’ Protected by the Windows OS; readable only by SYSTEM. Targeted via Volume Shadow Copy (VSS) attacks.
# ==============================================================================
# POWERSHELL ACTIVE DIRECTORY PRIVILEGED ACCOUNT & DELEGATION AUDIT SCRIPT
# Requires: Remote Server Administration Tools (RSAT) / ActiveDirectory Module
# ==============================================================================
Import-Module ActiveDirectory -ErrorAction Stop
Write-Host "==========================================================================" -ForegroundColor Cyan
Write-Host " ACTIVE DIRECTORY DOMAIN GOVERNANCE & SECURITY AUDIT" -ForegroundColor Cyan
Write-Host "==========================================================================" -ForegroundColor Cyan
# 1. Audit Tier-0 High-Privilege Administrative Groups
$PrivilegedGroups = @(
"Domain Admins",
"Enterprise Admins",
"Schema Admins",
"Account Operators",
"Backup Operators"
)
Write-Host "`n[*] AUDITING TIER-0 PRIVILEGED GROUP MEMBERSHIPS:" -ForegroundColor Yellow
foreach ($Group in $PrivilegedGroups) {
try {
$Members = Get-ADGroupMember -Identity $Group -Recursive | Select-Object Name, SamAccountName, ObjectClass
Write-Host " βββ Group: $Group (Total Members: $($Members.Count))" -ForegroundColor Green
foreach ($User in $Members) {
Write-Host " β β’ Member: $($User.SamAccountName) [$($User.ObjectClass)]" -ForegroundColor Gray
}
} catch {
Write-Host " βββ Group: $Group [Not Present in Domain]" -ForegroundColor DarkGray
}
}
# 2. Identify Accounts with Kerberos Pre-Authentication Disabled (AS-REP Roasting Targets)
Write-Host "`n[*] AUDITING FOR ACCOUNTS WITH DONT_REQ_PREAUTH (AS-REP ROASTABLE):" -ForegroundColor Yellow
$AsrepRoastable = Get-ADUser -Filter {DoesNotRequirePreAuth -eq $True} -Properties DoesNotRequirePreAuth, PasswordLastSet
if ($AsrepRoastable.Count -gt 0) {
foreach ($Target in $AsrepRoastable) {
Write-Host " [!] HIGH RISK: Account '$($Target.SamAccountName)' requires NO Kerberos Pre-Auth!" -ForegroundColor Red
Write-Host " Last Password Set: $($Target.PasswordLastSet)" -ForegroundColor Gray
}
} else {
Write-Host " [β] Clean: Zero accounts configured with pre-authentication disabled." -ForegroundColor Green
}
# 3. Identify Computer Accounts with Unconstrained Delegation (High Privilege Pivot Risk)
Write-Host "`n[*] AUDITING FOR UNCONSTRAINED KERBEROS DELEGATION:" -ForegroundColor Yellow
$UnconstrainedComputers = Get-ADComputer -Filter {TrustedForDelegation -eq $True} -Properties TrustedForDelegation
foreach ($Comp in $UnconstrainedComputers) {
# Exclude Domain Controllers which require unconstrained delegation by default
if ($Comp.SamAccountName -notmatch "DC") {
Write-Host " [!] DANGER: Workstation '$($Comp.SamAccountName)' has UNCONSTRAINED DELEGATION enabled!" -ForegroundColor Red
Write-Host " If a Domain Admin connects to this machine, its TGT is cached in memory for theft!" -ForegroundColor Gray
}
}
CRITICAL WINDOWS SECURITY AUDIT EVENT IDS (EID):
βββββββββββ¬βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ¬βββββββββββββββββββ¬ββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
β EVENT IDβ EVENT DESCRIPTION β ATTACK VECTOR β ANALYST DETECTION CRITERIA β
βββββββββββΌβββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββΌβββββββββββββββββββΌββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ€
β EID 4624β Successful Account Logon β Lateral Movement,β LogonType 3 = Network (SMB/RPC) β
β β β Pass-the-Hash β LogonType 10 = Remote Desktop RDP β
β β β β Check: Is NTLM used instead of Krb? β
βββββββββββΌβββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββΌβββββββββββββββββββΌββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ€
β EID 4625β Failed Account Logon Attempt β Brute-Force, β SubStatus 0xC000006A (Bad Password β
β β β Credential Spray β High frequency from single source β
βββββββββββΌβββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββΌβββββββββββββββββββΌββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ€
β EID 4672β Special Privileges Assigned β Privilege Escal- β Fired when administrative token is β
β β to New Logon (SeDebugPrivilege)ation, Pass-the-Hash created (SeDebugPrivilege granted) β
βββββββββββΌβββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββΌβββββββββββββββββββΌββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ€
β EID 4768β Kerberos TGT Requested β Initial Domain β Failure 0x18 = Pre-auth failed. β
β β (AS-REQ / AS-REP) β Authentication β Failure 0x25 = Clock skew error. β
βββββββββββΌβββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββΌβββββββββββββββββββΌββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ€
β EID 4769β Kerberos Service Ticket (TGS) β Kerberoasting β Ticket Options: 0x40810000 β
β β Requested (TGS-REQ / TGS-REP) β (T1558.003) β Ticket Encryption: 0x17 (RC4)! β
β β β β High-volume requests across SPNs β
βββββββββββΌβββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββΌβββββββββββββββββββΌββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ€
β EID 4776β Domain Controller Attempted β NTLM Relay, β Fired whenever NTLM validation is β
β β to Validate Credentials (NTLMβ Pass-the-Hash β processed by Domain Controller β
βββββββββββΌβββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββΌβββββββββββββββββββΌββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ€
β EID 7045β New System Service Installed β Lateral Movement β Process creation via PsExec, β
β β β Persistence β malicious driver installation β
βββββββββββΌβββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββΌβββββββββββββββββββΌββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ€
β EID 4698β Scheduled Task Created β Persistence β Task created via schtasks / wmic β
β β β (T1053.005) β executing script in C:\Users\... β
βββββββββββ΄βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ΄βββββββββββββββββββ΄ββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
WINDOWS HARDENING DEFECTS & ARCHITECTURAL CORRECTIONS:
// ==============================================================================
// PITFALL 1: LSASS MEMORY DUMPING VIA MIMIKATZ
// DEFECT: Adversaries with local admin privileges run procdump or Mimikatz to dump
// the memory of lsass.exe, extracting all cached plaintext passwords and NTLM hashes.
// CORRECTION 1: Enable LSA Protection (RunAsPPL) via Registry:
// reg add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa" /v RunAsPPL /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f
// (Prevents non-protected processes from reading LSASS memory via OpenProcess).
// CORRECTION 2: Enable Windows Defender Credential Guard:
// Uses Hyper-V Virtualization-Based Security (VBS) to move credential secrets into
// an isolated virtual machine (LSAIso.exe) completely inaccessible to kernel rootkits!
// ==============================================================================
// ==============================================================================
// PITFALL 2: NTLM FALLBACK VULNERABILITY (SILENT PASS-DOWN)
// DEFECT: Environment allows NTLM when Kerberos fails.
// Adversaries intentionally poison DNS or block port 88 (Kerberos KDC), forcing
// clients to downgrade to vulnerable NTLMv2 which can be relayed to target servers!
// CORRECTION: Enforce Network Security: Restrict NTLM: Incoming NTLM traffic = Deny All,
// and enforce Kerberos explicitly across internal domain boundaries via GPO.
// ==============================================================================
// ==============================================================================
// PITFALL 3: THE "DOMAIN ADMIN LOGS INTO COMPROMISED WORKSTATION" TRAP
// DEFECT: Domain Admins use their master administrative credentials to troubleshoot
// an ordinary employee's infected desktop workstation.
// CONSEQUENCE: The Domain Admin's Kerberos TGT and NTLM hash are cached in that
// workstation's LSASS memory! The attacker steals the credentials and compromises
// the entire Active Directory Forest within minutes!
// CORRECTION: Enforce Enterprise Access Model (Tiered Administration):
// β’ Tier 0 (Domain Controllers, Forest Root): Managed ONLY from Dedicated Privileged
// Access Workstations (PAWs). Tier 0 accounts NEVER log into Tier 1/2 systems!
// β’ Tier 1 (Enterprise Servers, Databases): Managed with separate server admin accounts.
// β’ Tier 2 (User Workstations, Laptops): Managed with local admin accounts.
// ==============================================================================
WINDOWS SECURITY INTERNALS & ACTIVE DIRECTORY SPECIFICATION MATRIX:
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββ¬βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ¬βββββββββββββββββββ¬ββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
β SUBSYSTEM / COMPONENT β IMPLEMENTATION LOCATION β ATTACK VECTOR β ENTERPRISE DEFENSIVE CONTROL β
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββΌβββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββΌβββββββββββββββββββΌββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ€
β SAM Registry Hive β C:\Windows\System32\config\SAM β Offline cracking,β BitLocker Full Disk Encryptionβ
β β SYSKEY protected at rest β Volume Shadow cpyβ Restrict local Administrator β
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββΌβββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββΌβββββββββββββββββββΌββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ€
β LSASS Subsystem β lsass.exe process memory β Mimikatz memory β Credential Guard (VBS/LSAIso),β
β β (User-Mode Security Broker) β dump, PtH β LSA Protection (RunAsPPL = 1) β
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββΌβββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββΌβββββββββββββββββββΌββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ€
β Kerberos v5 (KDC) β Active Directory Service β Kerberoasting, β Group Managed Service Accountsβ
β β UDP / TCP Port 88 β AS-REP Roasting β (gMSA), AES-256 Kerberos keys β
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββΌβββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββΌβββββββββββββββββββΌββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ€
β krbtgt Account β Master Domain Account β Golden Ticket β Reset krbtgt password TWICE β
β β Signs all valid TGT tickets β Forgery (T1558) β periodically via script β
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββΌβββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββΌβββββββββββββββββββΌββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ€
β NTLM Authentication β msv1_0.dll SSP β NTLM Relay, β Enforce SMB Signing, Disable β
β β Challenge-Response Protocol β Pass-the-Hash β LLMNR/NBT-NS, Restrict NTLM β
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββΌβββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββΌβββββββββββββββββββΌββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ€
β Active Directory DB β C:\Windows\NTDS\ntds.dit β DCSync Attack, β Restrict Replicating Directoryβ
β β ESE / JET Blue database engine β NTDS extraction β Changes privileges on domain β
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββΌβββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββΌβββββββββββββββββββΌββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ€
β Security Ref. Monitor β ntoskrnl.exe β Privilege Escal- β Token privilege stripping, β
β (SRM) β (Executive Kernel Space) β ation Bypass β User Account Control (UAC) β
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββΌβββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββΌβββββββββββββββββββΌββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ€
β Privileged Access Model β Tier 0, Tier 1, Tier 2 β Lateral Movement β Privileged Access Workstationsβ
β (Tiered Administration) β Domain Separation Model β Credential Pivot β (PAWs), Deny network logons β
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββ΄βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ΄βββββββββββββββββββ΄ββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ€
β TOP 5 WINDOWS & ACTIVE DIRECTORY HARDENING PRINCIPLES: β
β 1. Isolate LSASS via Credential Guard: Use hardware virtualization to block memory dump utilities. β
β 2. Enforce Tiered Administration: Never log into a workstation with a Domain Admin credential. β
β 3. Disable Legacy Protocols: Disable LLMNR, NetBIOS, and SMBv1 to eliminate broadcast relay attacks. β
β 4. Protect Service Accounts with gMSAs: Eliminate Kerberoasting by using 120-character rotating keys. β
β 5. Monitor Event Logs Aggressively: Audit EID 4624 (LogonType 3), EID 4769, and EID 7045 in SIEM. β
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ